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Abstract
This paper presents a national case study-based analysis of the numerous dimensions to cyberse-
curity education and how they are prioritised, implemented and accredited; from understanding the
interaction of hardware and software, moving from theory to practice (and vice versa), to human
factors, policy and politics (as well as various other important facets). A multitude of model curricula
and recommendations have been presented and discussed in international fora in recent years, with
varying levels of impact on education, policy and practice. This paper address three key questions: i)
what is taught and what should be taught for cybersecurity to general computer science students; ii)
should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone or in an integrated manner to general computer science
students; and iii) can accreditation by national professional, statutory and regulatory bodies enhance
the provision of cybersecurity within a body’s jurisdiction?
Evaluating how cybersecurity is taught in all aspects of computer science is clearly a task of
considerable size, one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead a case study-based research
approach – primarily focusing on the UK – has been adopted to evaluate the evidence of the teaching
of cybersecurity within general computer science to university-level students. Thus, in the context
of widespread international computer science/engineering curriculum reform, what does this need to
embed cybersecurity knowledge and skills mean more generally for institutions and educators, and
how can we teach this subject more effectively? Through this UK case study, and by contrasting
with related initiatives in the US, we demonstrate the positive effect that national accreditation
requirements can have, and offer some recommendations both for future research and curriculum
developments.
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1 Introduction
Cybersecurity has increasingly been a headline feature in the news over recent years, generally prompted
by spectacular breaches, including major credit reference agencies [1], telecoms companies [2], national
airlines [3], online dating websites [4], and even between sovereign governments [5]. These major breaches
have had significant impact on both individual citizens and society in general, requiring attention from
organisations of all sizes:
“...[need to] change the culture in your organisation around cyber security; to try to do for
cyber what has been done so successfully for health and safety, for example, over the last ten
years — to get everybody to take it seriously; to take the risk management process seriously
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and drive that down through the organisation.” Robert Hannigan [6], former Director of
GCHQ
These global cybersecurity crises have compelled academic institutions to address the demand for
educated cybersecurity professionals [7]. As no shared framework for “cybersecurity” as an academic
discipline exists, growth has been unfocused and largely driven by training materials, which makes it
harder to establish a common body of knowledge (for example, in the UK, the CyBOK project [8] is still a
work in progress). An international perspective is harder still, as different nations use different criteria to
define local needs [9]. As a result, new programmes entering this space are free to conceptualise, design,
package and market their initiatives, as there is no globally accepted reference model for cybersecurity to
allow employers or students to understand the extent or ambition of a given cybersecurity program [10,
11].
With this significant economic and societal focus on cybersecurity, there are calls for formal education
– school-level as well as tertiary – to respond to this situation, at the individual level and via recommended
curricula [12, 13] and professional accreditation requirements [14, 15]. This is further reinforced by a
wider focus on digital skills and computer science education reform, especially across the nations of the
UK [16–18].
An ACM working group [11], established in 2018 as part of the Innovation and Technology in Com-
puter Science Education (ITiCSE) conference series, has been capturing global perspectives on cyberse-
curity education, but as of July 2019 has yet to report its full findings. An aim of the ITiCSE working
group is to develop a taxonomy for approaches to cybersecurity education, resulting in improved stan-
dards and goals for many different types of cybersecurity programmes; a further aim is to “catalog existing
[. . . ] knowledge materials”, but there is no mention of any quality control over these. Nevertheless, it
is one thing to write national curricula, specifications and requirements, and another thing to deliver
appropriate and relevant education and skills; this paper asks how well this is done in practice.
2 Cybersecurity For All, Or Just For Specialists?
In one sense, this title is a false dichotomy: there is a serious need for cybersecurity specialists (estimates
vary, but are always large), but also all in IT need to know some cybersecurity – thus, there is a case
for depth as well as breadth [19,20]. This is not a new concern [21], but it is a growing one.
This need to build knowledge, skills and capacity in the area of cybersecurity has also led to the
establishment of a number of strategic policy initiatives from a number of national governments, for
example the publication in 2016 of the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy [22] (along with the setting up of the
National Cyber Security Centre, as well as increased scrutiny of the resilience of the UK’s critical national
infrastructure [23]; also industry-focused initiatives such as Cyber Essentials1), the EU Cybersecurity
Act [24] (which reinforces the mandate of the EU Agency for Cybersecurity: ENISA, the European
Union Agency for Network and Information and Security), or the National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE) in the USA [25].
The teaching of cybersecurity in higher education pre-dates these initiatives and there has been
recognition of the need for the inclusion of cybersecurity as part of the discipline of computer science
for a number of years [9, 26]. There have been a number of international initiatives to define curricula
to support this, for example the 2013 ACM Computer Science Curricula Recommendations [27, which
added “Information Assurance and Security” for the first time], as well as for specialised cybersecurity
degree programmes [28]. There has been debate as to whether cybersecurity is distinct discipline from
computer science [7]; the consensus increasingly is that cybersecurity is both a discipline in its own right
and that cybersecurity should be taught within computer science and related degrees. Recent evolution
of cybersecurity education shows that it has begun to take shape as a true academic perspective, as
opposed to simply being a training domain for certain specialised jobs. More recent work presents
cybersecurity as a “meta-discipline”; that is, cybersecurity should be used as an aggregate label for a
wide variety of similar disciplines, much in the same way that the terms “engineering” and “computing”
are commonly used [29].
1Cyber Essentials is a UK Government-backed, industry-supported scheme to help organisations protect themselves
against common online threats: https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov.uk
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Further to the substantial computer science and digital skills curriculum reform across the UK [16,
18, 30, 31], the question is raised whether cybersecurity should be formally taught in schools, as part
of compulsory school-level education. While aspects of “e-safety” and principles of protecting personal
data are increasingly visible in formal curricula [32], the majority of UK schoolchildren’s exposure to
cybersecurity skills is through national extra-curricular competitions, for example Cyber Security Chal-
lenge UK2. The Institute of Coding, a £40m+ initiative by the UK Government to transform the digital
skills profile of the country [33] – but primarily focused on university graduates – does indeed mention
cybersecurity, but merely as a sub-item in one work package.
3 Methodology
3.1 Research Questions
There are various levels of specialism at which cybersecurity education and skills can be addressed; for
example:
(i) The generalist computer science graduate;
(ii) The generalist computer science masters graduate;
(iii) The specialist computer science graduate;
(iv) The specialist computer science masters graduate;
(v) The reskilling/upskilling/professional development of the IT industry and the wider workforce;
(vi) The general public — this is important, but there are many initiatives in this area, which are,
rightly, largely separated from computing education.
The focus of this paper is on (i)–(ii): the general computer science graduate. We thus focus on three
research questions:
RQ1 What cybersecurity is taught and what cybersecurity should be taught to the general computer
science students?
RQ2 Should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone or in an integrated manner to general computer science
students?
RQ3 Can accreditation by professional, statutory and regulatory bodies (PSRBs) enhance the provision
of cybersecurity within a body’s jurisdiction?
3.2 Research Approach
A UK-focused case study-based approach has been adopted for this project. As is common in case
study-based research, many alternative case studies could have been chosen; furthermore, the cases are
illustrative rather than comprehensive in terms of the available case studies or challenges. The cases
were evaluated to articulate the progress made and highlight opportunities for future developments in
education and practice.
The first set of cases that are considered are the current situation in terms of recommendations
from a sample of relevant PSRBs, together with the published evidence regarding compliance with these
recommendations; this is contextualised by the wider policy context. Together these provide a context
to the ongoing enhancement initiatives in the area of cybersecurity education.
In order to address RQ1 and RQ2 a number of specific case studies pertaining to challenges of
delivering cybersecurity to undergraduate computer science students are evaluated. Namely: an industry
problem with evident cybersecurity implications; the current state of educational resources with respect
to cybersecurity; and the challenges evident in the UK related to the recruitment and retention of
suitably qualified academic staff in the cyber security area.
2https://www.cybersecuritychallenge.org.uk
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Finally, in order to address RQ3 , case studies are evaluated related to the challenges and successes
of PSRB accreditation of cybersecurity in undergraduate computer science in one jurisdiction (the UK).
As discussed, mandating cybersecurity within PSRB accreditation in this jurisdiction is at a reasonably
mature stage.
3.3 Current State of Play
The ACM/IEEE-CS Joint Task Force on Computing Curricula [27, p. 97] takes a distinct view on the
Knowledge Areas (KAs) related to RQ2 :
“The Information Assurance and Security KA is unique among the set of KAs presented here
given the manner in which the topics are pervasive throughout other KAs.”
It proposes nine “core” hours and 63.5 distributed across the other KAs. Nevertheless, the situation
on the ground in the USA is different [34]:
“Universities suffer shortcomings, as well. Roughly 85 of them offer undergraduate and/or
graduate degrees in cybersecurity. There is a big catch, however. Far more diversified com-
puter science programs, which attract substantially more students, don’t mandate even one
cybersecurity course.”
The UK situation is distinctly different: 61% of UK courses offer mandatory cybersecurity content,
and this research was based on web scraping [35, Table 1]. As such it represents a lower bound since
not all coverage will necessarily be clearly articulated in publicly available documentation online. It is
at least plausible to attribute this difference to differences in the accreditation regimes, as the external
circumstances, governmental pressures, and professional body/learned society curricula are all similar.
UK BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT (BCS) has had a requirement to include information security
in the curriculum since 2010, and has expected coverage of an agreed cybersecurity syllabus since
2015 (Table 1), with the result that all accredited universities should be compliant by 2020 (due
to the five-year cycle). More precisely, accredited degrees have been expected to demonstrate
coverage of “2.1.9 Knowledge and understanding of information security issues in relation to the
design, development and the use of information systems” [14, p. 30] since 2010 with an enhanced
cybersecurity related definition of what this entails since 2015 [14, p. 17–18].
USA The Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) has equally had cybersecurity (IAS: “Informa-
tion Assurance and Security”) in the curriculum since 2013 [27], but it is not the accrediting body.
The Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) is, and is requiring IAS with
effect from the 2019-20 cycle (self-study reports due 1 July 2019): more precisely [36, Table 3]
“The computing topics must include: . . . Principles and practices for secure computing. . . ”. This
should mean that all accredited universities should be compliant by 2025 (due to their six-year
cycle).
4 Challenges: (RQ1 and RQ2 )
The ACM Computer Science Curricula Recommendations [27] states three Tier-1 and six Tier-2 hours
for “Information Assurance and Security”, but this is the “IAS-only” topics, and ACM expects 32 Tier-1
and 31.5 Tier-2 hours for IAS topics embedded in other Knowledge Areas.
The UK’s official body of knowledge resource, the CyBOK project [8], has produced reference doc-
umentation for some (as of June 2019: five final, seven for comment, out of a planned total of 19)
knowledge areas, which are useful references for the experienced educator looking for a definition or
characterisation, but a long way from being a textbook (which is not their aim).
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4.1 Industry Standards: PCI DSS
Is teaching cybersecurity different from other computing topics? Lecturing is probably not the best way;
how should we use real-life case studies (e.g. British Airways [37]) and authentic assessment? Recent
work suggests that there are benefits from teaching this discipline area in a more practical manner [38];
one would be by the inclusion of pertinent cybersecurity standards in the curricula.
The Payments Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) [39] is one such standard, under-
pinning all processing of credit/debit cards globally. Nevertheless, they are very rarely mentioned in
generalist computer scientist courses. This would not matter so much if everyone handling payments
data were sent by their employers on an effective PCI DSS course. However, the payments business is
now so spread across websites, often run by small and medium enterprises (SME), or non-specialists.
Even larger enterprises are not immune: the 2018 British Airways breach was caused by a failure to
adhere to PCI DSS in the website maintenance [37].
It is an interesting question as to whether standards such as PCI DSS should be addressed within
degree courses (clearly degree courses can never cover all standards) or whether they should be addressed
in professional training courses. However it appears the current situation is not ideal from the perspec-
tive of industry (or users of systems) and the inclusion of key standards could be seen as a valuable
enhancement activity to the coverage of cybersecurity within generalist computer science courses.
4.2 Educational Resources
4.2.1 SQL Injection
It is 15 years since [40] wrote “All the topics listed above should be presented in the first Database
Course”, and the first such topic was SQL injection [41,42]. SQL injection as an attack has been around
for twenty years [43], has its own cartoon and website3. Nevertheless SQL injection is still a major
weakness: number one in the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 [44], and has
been in the Top 10 since at least 2003. CyBOK states “. . . a wide range of attack techniques for exploiting
SQL injection or script injection are known and documented.” [45].
Clearly such a major weakness should be well-taught; in general it is hard to determine what is
actually delivered as part of a specific degree programme, but a reasonable proxy for this is the content
of recommended textbooks. This was the rationale for a 2019 analysis of database textbooks used by 44
of the top 50 computer science departments in the USA [46]. There were seven such books, but three
books accounted for the 36 of the 44 universities. Five of the seven (30 of the 44) had no mention of
SQL injection. On the other two, the more popular one has a seriously flawed discussion4, and the other,
while generally excellent, had a presentational problem5. This oversight is not limited to textbooks:
although Wikipedia has an article on SQL Injection, it was not linked from the SQL page itself at the
time of writing6.
4.2.2 The Case of Java
A recommendation for future work is a comprehensive survey equivalent to [46] for Java textbooks.
Indeed, many such books go nowhere near security applications. But this means that the programmer
who has to implement security is left to the documentation of the package/API being used, and to
informal resources. [47] analysed 503 cybersecurity-related postings on the popular Stack Overflow
online resource. 53% were about the Spring Security framework7, dominated by authentication (45%).
3See: https://xkcd.com/327/ (dating back to 2007, according to the Internet Archive) and http://bobby-tables.com/
4“However, the paper implies that using parameters is equivalent to using a function to add escape characters around user
input. This is incorrect, as using parameters allows SQL statements to be pre-compiled, and prevents any user input from
being interpreted as code, while escaping user input is not recommended as a sole defense since imperfect escape functions
can easily be subverted.” [46]
5“However, the fact that the first example should not be used is not discussed until two pages after the example in the text,
and is not mentioned at all in the caption or on the page where the figure appears. This means a student who is skimming
the text looking for an example to modify for their own code could simply copy the code that first appears in the example,
without being aware that this is in fact an example of what they shouldn’t do.” [46]
6Fixing this is a suggestion for future work.
7https://projects.spring.io/spring-security/
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The discussion [47, §4.3.1] of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) is especially worrying. By default, Spring
implicitly enables protection against this. But all the accepted answers to CSRF-related failures simply
suggested disabling the check. There were no negative comments about this, and indeed a typical
response is “Adding csrf().disable() solved the issue!!! I have no idea why it was enabled by default”.
As of writing, there were no negative comments about this disabling of a vital security feature. This
research was further developed by [48] (and popularised in a security community in [49]). Their first
finding was:
“644 out of the 1,429 inspected answer posts (45%) are insecure, meaning that insecure
suggestions popularly exist on SO. Insecure answers dominate, in particular, the SSL/TLS
category” [355 insecure versus 150 secure, i.e. > 70%].
4.2.3 Android
Another recommendation for future work is a comprehensive survey equivalent to [46] for Android
textbooks; [50] looked specifically at the use of resources from Stack Overflow in Android applications.
The key finding was:
“We found that 15.4% of all 1.3 million Android applications contained security-related code
snippets from Stack Overflow. Out of these 97.9% contain at least one insecure code snippet.”
Two caveats (in opposite directions) should be noted. The labelling was conservative, in that snippets
were only labelled as insecure if that was demonstrable, and, for example, mere use of outdated SSL/TLS
was not automatically deemed insecure. On the other hand, the insecure snippet might have been used
in a way that did not expose the insecurity. The uncritical reading of Stack Overflow was also noted in
[51, Slide 29]. Their key recommendation [51, Slide 32] was “Improve documentation: Clarify what you
can(not) copy/paste”.
4.2.4 Agile
A further recommendation for future work is a comprehensive survey equivalent to [46] for “Agile” text-
books. Many authors have found disconnects between Agile practices and secure software development:
notably [52] for small projects and [53] for large projects. Agile’s preference for functionality over non-
functional requirements is clearly displayed in practice. [54] asked 20 student developers to imagine they
were part of a team working on creating a social networking site for our university and to implement
a password storage mechanism for this. 10 (“primed”) were explicitly told that the storage had to be
secure and 10 (“unprimed”) were not. None of the unprimed ones implemented any security. This would
also reaffirm the point raised in section 4.1, regarding the effective use of industrial case studies and
authentic assessment approaches.
4.2.5 Informal Resources
The web abounds with informal resources, such as tutorials and code snippets. How good are these, and
how good are people at using these? This has been looked at by [55], taking the top five search results
from Google for six queries. Of these 30 tutorials, six had SQL injection weaknesses, and three had
Cross-Site Scripting8 weaknesses. Searching for these fragments in PHP projects on GitHub found 820
instances of these fragments, of which 117 were verified manually to be vulnerable — 80% of which were
vulnerable to SQL injection. Some students clearly make use of these resources; thus a recommendation
of future work is to explore and evaluate students’ (and indeed others’) use of such informal resources.
4.3 Faculty
It is well known that cybersecurity skills are in short supply, in both industry [34] and academia [9]. For
example:
8Number 7 in OWASP’s Top Ten [44].
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Research into the state of IT conducted annually by Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) [56]
has revealed that the skills gap in information security continues to widen and has doubled in
the past five years. In 2014, 23% of respondents to the survey stated that their organisation
had a problematic shortage of information security skills. This had climbed to 51% at the
beginning of this year. Clearly, this is an issue which is being felt across many industries and
organisations, and is a concern which extends beyond IT leadership into the boardroom. [57]
The ESG survey is international, but ESG have confirmed that the UK figures are very similar. In
the UK, there has been a resurgence of job adverts to recruit academic staff with specialisms in cyber-
security over the past three years. The demand for cybersecurity skills in industry makes it difficult for
academia to attract academics with knowledge, practical experience, research background and academic
aspirations. As universities expand their cybersecurity provision it is not uncommon to find multiple
jobs advertised at the same time. Recent example have included a professor of cybersecurity, two senior
academic positions and two junior academic positions in one advert. There are other examples in the
UK of cybersecurity lecturing jobs remaining unfilled for longer than a year; there are also examples of
cybersecurity research groups moving en masse from one university to another.
5 Accreditation by PSRBs (RQ3)
In the UK — as in most jurisdictions — higher education provision addresses general computer sci-
ence and specialist cybersecurity courses. A significant number of undergraduate and postgraduate
programmes are available in both the areas of computer science and cybersecurity (and closely related
fields, such as computer security, digital/computer forensics, etc). The UK’s Universities and Colleges
Admissions Service (UCAS) lists over 40 higher education institutions providing undergraduate qualifi-
cations related to cybersecurity for entry in September 2019. An even larger number of UK institutions
provide study opportunities related to more general undergraduate computer science: UCAS lists 246
providers for undergraduate programmes for the 2019/2020 academic year.
Accreditation has evolved to directly addresses the cybersecurity challenges in both general computer
science programmes and specialist cybersecurity programmes. In the UK, accreditation in the broad
computing area is being performed by a few organisations with overlapping interests and priorities.
These include:
5.1 National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
The NCSC is a UK Government organisation tasked with enhancing the cybersecurity of the UK. The
NCSC publishes and accredits to a number of cybersecurity standards [15]; these standards are linked to
the ACM recommendations for curricula [27]. To date, the major focus of NCSC accreditation has been
upon Masters degrees specialising in cybersecurity. More recently the NCSC has also began accrediting
integrative masters programmes, undergraduate degrees in cybersecurity, and computer science degrees
with a significant cybersecurity focus.
The NCSC have accredited 15 cybersecurity MSc programmes with a further 11 provisional accred-
ited, 3 integrated masters cybersecurity programmes and 1 cybersecurity degree programme, with a
further 2 provisionally accredited. Hence the extent of accreditation is currently reasonably limited in
terms of reach to computer science programmes. This appears to be a positive initiative that will further
develop over the next few years, especially with increasing industry engagement in this area.
5.2 Not-for-Profit Organisations
Tech Partnership Degrees is a not-for-profit organisation that provides endorsements to higher education
programmes with specific curricula elements aimed at job market requirements. One of the curricula
elements is related to cybersecurity. Tech Partnership Degrees have a specialist scope, endorsing pro-
grammes in the named areas of “IT Management for Business” and “Software Engineering for Business”.
Tech Partnership Degrees currently endorse 14 IT Management for Business Programmes and five Soft-
ware Engineering for Business Programmes. As such, Tech Partnership Degrees currently have limited
impact upon more general computer science education and none upon specialist cybersecurity education.
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The Institute of Coding9 is a not-for-profit entity, led by the University of Bath, that intends to
enhance how digital skills are developed in higher education in the UK [33]. This is likely to include
cybersecurity related skills. Like the Tech Partnership, the focus is upon job market requirements.
Additionally the Institute is looking at potentially endorsing the demonstrable capabilities of graduates
as shown by their university studies, work experience and work placements. Given the size of this
initiative this potentially has a significant role to play however at time of writing it is clearly a work in
progress.
5.3 Professional Bodies and Learned Societies
Both BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT (BCS) and the Institution of Engineering and Technology
(IET) accredit programmes in the general area of computer science and the more specialist area of cyber-
security discipline areas. The accreditation provided by these institutes are underpinned by international
initiatives such as the Washington Accord10 and the Seoul Accord11. These memoranda support the
internationalising of the curriculum and promote consistency and parity in computer science education
globally. These professional bodies are also UK charities and hence have responsibilities for public good
which extends beyond short term job market needs [58, 59]. Both the BCS and the IET have a long
history of expecting coverage of environmental factors within the programmes they accredit. The BCS
has for a number of years been expecting significant coverage of what it terms Legal, Social, Ethical and
Professional Issues [60]. Clearly cybersecurity has been and continues to be part of these expectations.
6 Case Study: BCS Accreditation
In recent years the BCS has evolved its accreditation practices to promote and mandate the inclusion of
cybersecurity within the programmes the body accredits. The timeline which this process has followed
in presented in Table 1, and will be discussed in more detail in the following case study.
6.1 Developing Expectations
Internationally the expectations regarding both the breadth and depth of the expected cybersecurity
coverage has been the subject of much discussion, debate and analysis. Like many governments, the UK
Government has actively been seeking ways to address this [22, 62]. In parallel to the work completed
by the ACM [27] in the USA, considerable effort in the UK have been taken to ensure industry, higher
education, government and the relevant professional bodies collaborated on a set of guidelines which
are to the benefit of the various stakeholders and wider society [64]. In 2013, an initiative was set up
by (ISC)2, CPHC (the representative body of UK computer science departments) and the UK Cabinet
Office to examine embedding cybersecurity into undergraduate degrees in the UK. Three workshops in
2013 and 2015 attempted to define the principles of cybersecurity education and proposed a framework
for embedding these principles in UK computer science curricula. Attendees at the workshops included
industry, professional bodies, UK government departments and more than 30 universities that offer
undergraduate computer science degrees. This work initially lead to a white paper related to a proposal
in the form of a white paper in 2014 [63], followed by a set of guidelines in 2015 [61]. The BCS agreed
to adopt the outputs into their accreditation criteria. This was the first time that cybersecurity has
been extensively referenced within accreditation criteria for computing and IT-related degrees. The fact
that cybersecurity is included as a component of the BCS accreditation criteria reflects the importance
placed on cybersecurity and the expectation that all computing graduates should have knowledge and
skills in cybersecurity as they move towards chartered status.
The produced reference guidelines (“Cybersecurity Principles and Learning Outcomes”) [61] estab-
lished a baseline of common knowledge, example learning outcome domains for cybersecurity within
the computer science courses and guidance on embedding the concepts. The document provides specific
guidance for embedding and enhancing relevant cybersecurity principles, concepts and learning outcomes
within their undergraduate curricula. The document suggested five areas of coverage
9https://instituteofcoding.org
10http://www.ieagreements.org/accords/washington/.
11https://www.seoulaccord.org/.
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IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3 ) - A. Developing
Expectations
UK Government Cybersecurity Strategy [22] November 2011
Three workshops of a consortium of industry,
academia and government bodies – led by CPHC
and (ISC)2 – leading to the development of cy-
bersecurity learning guidelines to be embedded
into BCS accredited UK computer science and IT-
related degrees [61]
2013 to June 2015
UK Government report Cybersecurity Skills,
Business Perspectives and Government’s Next
Steps Report Released [62]
March 2014
Council of Professors and Heads of Computing
(CPHC) Identifies Cybersecurity as one the top 3
concerns in Computing
April 2014
Joint Development of White Paper from CPHC
and The International Information Systems Secu-
rity Certification Consortium (ISC)2 [63]
April -November 2014
Extended Cybersecurity Criteria included in BCS
Accreditation Guidelines [14]
June 2015
IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3 ) - B. What does
the BCS tell Universities?
Cybersecurity Principles Roadshow March-April 2016
IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3 ) - C. Accreditation
- what progress has been made?
All visited institutions expected to be fully com-
pliant (BCS follow a five-year accreditation cycle)
September 2020
Table 1: Timeline of the development of cybersecurity expectations in the UK
• Information and risk;
• Threats and attacks;
• Cybersecurity architecture and operations;
• Secure systems and products; and
• Cybersecurity management.
The ambition of this approach was to influence the curricula of all programmes seeking accreditation
(regardless of the precise discipline area); it was not intended to be prescriptive or stifle innovation,
however it is intended to promote curricula that would benefit the students upon programmes, their
future employers and wider society. In this context this is realised as an expectation cybersecurity is an
inclusion in all degrees accredited by the BCS. e.g. the expectation for coverage is true for computer
science as well as cybersecurity programmes. Two criteria are expected to be covered by all programmes
seeking accreditation. These are:
“2.1.6 Recognise the legal, social, ethical and professional issues involved in the exploitation
of computer technology and be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical and
legal practices”’ [14]
“2.1.9 Knowledge and understanding of information security issues in relation to the design,
development and the use of information system” [14]
Additionally, programmes seeking Chartered Information Technology Professional (CITP) accredi-
tation also have to cover:
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“3.1.2 Knowledge and understanding of methods, techniques and tools for information mod-
elling, management and security” [14]
In the context of BCS accreditation, these requirements imply an exit standard that all students on a
programme must be able to demonstrate irrespective of the option choices they have made. This means
an institution applying for accreditation is expected to provide evidence that the criteria are taught
and assessed in a non-trivial manner, to and by all students upon the programme seeking accreditation.
An institution is expected to provide evidence in the form of programme and module specification
documentation and example assessment specifications (coursework and examinations). These criteria
and the expectation that they are taught and assessed has been present for a number of years.
The relevant BCS accreditation (criteria 2.1.6, 2.1.9 and 3.1.2, as presented above) is not prescrip-
tive, but encourages institutions to embed cybersecurity teaching across a range of subject areas in
the computer science curriculum such as programming, software design, databases, networking, archi-
tecture. In addition there an expectation that there is significant coverage of cybersecurity principles
and fundamentals – either as a stand alone module or as a significant component(s) of other modules.
This approach differs from the ACM approach [27], where the expectations are more explicit and the
curriculum expectations are specified at a more granular level.
6.2 What Are Universities Told?
The agreed Cybersecurity Principles and Learning Outcomes [61] were discussed with the wider education
community, led by CPHC. A series of workshops took place in 2015 which presented the rationale
for embedding cybersecurity in the curriculum of computer science degrees. The workshops included
case studies from universities who had embedded cybersecurity into their computer science curricula
illustrating different approaches to implementation. The workshops had 102 attendees from the academic
computer science community representing 60 UK Universities.
The BCS Guidelines on Course Accreditation are published online [14], with the BCS publishing
any changes that have been made [65]. When changes are made, the BCS communicates the changes
by email and in writing to all the BCS Educational Affiliates, that is all the institutions that seek
accreditation from the BCS. The expectations for cybersecurity were extended in the June 2015 version
of the guidelines for consideration at accreditation visits that took place from September 2015 or later.
This change to the accreditation guidelines is now in an implementation period. The accreditation
process adopted by the BCS is cyclic in nature; formally, the cycle is five years in duration. The
new expectations have been implemented as follows: to ensure continuous accreditation, accreditation
visits are normally scheduled every five years; at the time of the next visit in this accreditation cycle,
accreditation is conditional upon an institution having considered the guidelines and either adjusted the
curriculum to meet the new expectations or have a formal plan in place for when and how adjustments
will be made. It is anticipated that from 2020 the expectation will be all accredited programmes have
the new expectations fully embedded.
In the year prior to an accreditation visit, institutions are invited to a briefing from the BCS. The
intention of the briefing is to help ensure accreditation visits are successful from the perspective of both
the BCS and the institution. The briefings take place virtually and includes a summary of the process,
discussion of recent changes, guidance regarding the application and a summary of common issues that
are being seen in other institutions. Significant opportunity for seeking clarification is provided. One of
the issues often highlighted is that not all institutions have yet evolved their programmes to fully address
the increased expectation for cybersecurity. This is resulting in accreditation being contingent upon an
institution taking action to address this short fall or in some cases the withdrawal of accreditation. A
number of institutions are in the process of adjusting their curricula to meet the new expectations. In
this case, the BCS notes the changes to programme design, the outputs from which will be scrutinised
at the next accreditation visit.
6.3 Accreditation: What Progress Has Been Made?
This initiative is a collective attempt to formally include cybersecurity in all BCS Accredited pro-
grammes. Some of these programmes will be specialist cybersecurity programmes, however the majority
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will take a different emphasis; this is a work in progress. A full cycle of accreditation visits has not yet
taken place following the adjustment to the BCS Guidelines [65]. What is being observed is the majority
of visited institutions have now either adjusted their curricula to extend the coverage of cybersecurity
or have a plan in place to do so. However, a minority are requiring encouragement to do so.
From the start of the Autumn 2015 term, up to and including the Autumn 2018 term, the BCS
have carried out 70 accreditation visits (including four international visits). The BCS identified action
was required to address concerns related to cybersecurity at 16 institutions; thus, 54 institutions were
already delivering cybersecurity in keeping with the BCS expectations.
Long-term actions were expected from 12 institutions (six in 2015/16, three in 2016/17 and three
in Autumn 2018) who were awarded ‘At Threshold ’ judgments. Ten of these judgments were across
all programmes; one was specifically against a generalist masters programme only. This indicates that
the BCS will expect adjustments to have taken place before the next accreditation visit. As indicated
earlier, this was commonly the case that adjustments had been made to approved programmes of study,
however the adjusted modules had not yet been delivered so the evidence base was incomplete in terms
of how cybersecurity was assessed.
Short terms 90 Day Responses where required from four institutions; the outcomes of these actions
were as follows: (i) of the 11 UG programmes involved all were approved ‘At Threshold ’; (ii) of the
nine UG programmes involved, eight were approved and one refused; (iii) of the five UG programmes
involved, all approved ‘At Threshold ’; and (iv) of the 3 UG programmes involved, all 3 were refused.
Good practice was identified at one university by the commendation:
“The second year project provides an opportunity for exploring security aspects in depth with
an industrial use case.”
In summary, this shows that many UK institutions have now embedded cybersecurity in their pro-
vision, a number are in the process of doing so and a minority have chosen not to. Clearly not all
institutions in the UK necessarily have to apply for PSRB accreditation, or apply for accreditation for
all their programmes, but even so this is significant evidence of inclusion of cybersecurity to an agreed
standard.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The work presented in this paper is a first step towards better understanding the nature, design, struc-
ture and assessment of cybersecurity education in the UK, through the lens of accreditation. It is clear
that PSRB accreditation is having a positive effect on universities, supporting wider national policy im-
peratives. It is also clear that there is a significant need for mobilising the international computer science
academic community – alongside some of the existing initiatives presented at the start of this paper – to
continue this focus on cybersecurity education, and provide international comparators, portability and
sharing of best practice. With regards to the three research questions:
RQ1: What cybersecurity is taught and what cybersecurity should be taught to the general computer
science students?
The guidelines from both ACM and BCS are good for general education. However, the most
important item would seem to be an attitude of caution with respect to both offline (§4.2.1) and
online (§4.2.2) resources.
RQ2: Should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone or in an integrated manner to general computer science
students?
The recommendation in [27, p. 98] that cybersecurity be taught largely through other Knowledge
Areas is, in abstract, a good idea. However, in the current state of education resources (sections
§4.2) may be a counsel caution in this approach. It is more important that issues like SQL
injection [46] or correct use of SSL/TLS [48] be taught somewhere than that they not be taught at
all. Nevertheless, it is wrong for a complete curriculum to ignore cybersecurity issues for example:
• teach SQL without teaching SQL Injection [46];
11
• teach “web programming” without teaching Cross-Site Scripting [44, (XSS)];
• ignore the impact of GDPR upon systems development;
• uncritically teach the use of Agile development to develop secure systems.
The BCS-identified good practice of exploring cybersecurity via a project referencing Industry
Standards, possibly PCI DSS, is commended (§4.1).
RQ3: Can accreditation by PSRBs enhance the provision of cybersecurity within a body’s jurisdiction?
Accreditation (as practised by BCS in the UK) is a valuable tool in improving the standard of
cybersecurity teaching, and disseminating good practice, and should continue this. The time-lag
in adoption of cybersecurity in the USA seems to be caused by the accreditation differences more
than any other factors.
We also have the following specific recommendations:
1. Database courses should look carefully at the security aspects of the texts they use, and the
examples they quote, on the lines of [46].
2. Web Programming courses should do the same, with emphasis on the avoidance of Cross-Site
Scripting, and, for production use, the use of a suitable framework that has Cross-Site Request
Forgery protection12.
3. A study similar to [46] is recommended for future work focusing on Java development, Android
development and Agile development, and potentially other areas of the curriculum, to better
understand how modern textbooks support key areas of the curriculum.
4. All computer science courses should emphasise that informal resources should come with a “security
health warning”: see sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.2. One should probably use the data from [48]: “If you
pick up a SSL/TLS answer from Stack Overflow, there’s a 70% chance it’s insecure”.
5. Finally, further work exploring and evaluating effective pedagogical and assessment approaches for
cybersecurity education, in a similar vein to what has been seen with computer science education
more generally (e.g. [20]).
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